The information provided by the Consulting University is as follows:

“The Rector of the University of XXX imposed on a professor [interim holder] the penalty of suspension of functions for four and a half years, whose execution would be carried out from August 17, 2010 to February 16, 2015.

Subsequently, the Rector imposes, on the same interested party, a penalty of one year of suspension of functions for the commission of a serious misdemeanour, being notified to the interested party on 16 August.

Bearing in mind that the two sanctions for suspension of functions could not be carried out simultaneously, the University considered it appropriate to carry them out in succession. In this way, on November 19, 2010, the interested party was notified that the execution of the second sanction would begin on February 17, 2015, that is, from the completion of the suspension of functions imposed by the first sanction, thus understanding that the possible prescription of the serious lack of a year of suspension was interrupted by compliance with the first of the sanctions.”

In the light of these data, it is consulted whether the action described is correct or whether, on the contrary, the penalty is to be understood as prescribed for the duration of the prescription period (2 years for serious misdemeanours).

The disciplinary regime distinguishes two classes of prescription, that of infractions and those of sanctions.

In both cases, the action of the Administration, either aimed at demanding responsibility or aimed at complying with the sanction imposed, interrupts the statute of limitations and, therefore, the period allowed for it to occur.

This general rule must be nuanced in the sense that not every action of the Administration is valid to interrupt the prescription, but it is necessary that such action be diligent and that it is really aimed at achieving the desired objective, in the present case, the materialization of the imposed sanction; therefore, actions that are carried out with the sole purpose of formally interrupting the prescription are not valid for these purposes, but without actually seeking to comply with the obligation subject to that kind of deadline.

In this regard, and in view of the principle of legal certainty, as indicated by the Supreme Court in its judgment of 14 November 1985, in disciplinary matters, a legal situation must not be allowed to remain in a state of temporarily indefinite uncertainty and that due administrative action must be paralysed without any limitation of time, so that the period of limitation will not be interrupted by “unnecessary” decisions that are issued only for that purpose, and not for the purpose of fulfilling the activity to which it is bound.

In the present case, and according to the information provided by the consultant, the sanction has been executed and, therefore, the possible prescription alleged has been interrupted, said execution consisting in setting the exact dates on which the suspension of functions is to be carried out, which is the sanction imposed; the interested party has been notified, as indicated, of both the sanction and its execution.

Therefore, in this case, and in the light of the arguments put forward, it seems that there is no reason to object that the prescription of the sanction has occurred, since it has been executed in the terms set out by the University and that, in addition, its execution at an earlier time would not have been possible, unless it had been annulled, since it would have coincided in time with another sanction of the same type which, by its very nature, makes its simultaneous execution impossible.

All of the above is without prejudice to remember that, according to the regime of competences of this management center, the answers to queries issued by this general directorate are merely informative and, consequently, do not have the character of a binding criterion, nor do they give rise to rights or expectations of law, nor do they imply any link with the type of procedures to which they refer. In addition, since they are not mandatory or binding, the bodies to which such replies are addressed may, where appropriate, finally take a decision that does not correspond to the opinion contained therein.

The answers to queries contained in this bulletin deal with the issues raised in the light of the regulations in force at the time of their issuance, so that these answers may be affected by subsequent legislative changes or judicial resolutions.